They killed Ruslan Guzha,they don’t have to use a gun to kill some one,Ruslan has suicide himself last summer because of this murderers.
These sold out puppets get paid verywell,how much this judge and master got bribed ,what is the price of a human life,they killed Ruslan legally for money.
The question is are they murderer?
Guzha v. Eclipse Colour & Imaging Corp., 2007 4315 (ON SC)
COURT FILE NO.: 03-CV-257732SR
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
RE: Ruslan Guzha v. Eclipse Colour & Imaging Corp., and AIG Life of Canada
BEFORE: Mr. Justice H.J.W. Siegel
COUNSEL: Allan Rouben, for the Plaintiff
Ronald J. Ouellette, for the Defendant Eclipse Colour & Imaging Corp.
HEARD: January 24 2007
E N D O R S E M E N T
 The plaintiff brings two motions prior to the commencement of the trial in this action.
 In the first motion, the plaintiff seeks to: (1) amend the Statement of Claim to add an alternative claim for wrongful termination of the plaintiff at a date subsequent to the date of the alleged constructive dismissal; and (2) assert claims for aggravated or punitive damages based on breaches of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 and the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. O.1 and a failure of the defendant to accommodate the plaintiff. The defendant does not oppose the amendment but seeks an adjournment of the trial to prepare a defence in respect of the additional claims.
 The factual basis for the plaintiff’s claims for constructive dismissal on or about April 30, 2003 and for the alleged breaches of the statutes, as those claims are explained by Mr. Rouben, are essentially identical and are, therefore, addressed in the existing pleadings. The alternative claim, however, is based on additional facts that are not the subject of existing pleadings. The alternative claim is prompted by the delivery of a file from Human Resources Canada, which, in the usual way, only arrived very recently through no failing on the part of either party. The evidence supporting this alternative claim is modest, unless there was direct interaction between the parties that also relates to this claim but was not pleaded earlier. The claim for punitive damages, based on an alleged failure to accommodate the plaintiff, is not supported by any particulars in the proposed amended Statement of Claim. This argues against the need for an adjournment of the trial. However, as there is at least some evidence supporting the plaintiff’s alternative claim and his claim for punitive damages, leave to amend the Statement of Claim in the proposed form is granted.
 As mentioned, the defendant seeks a short adjournment to prepare its case in respect of the alternative claim. It says that, while the factual basis of the claim for wrongful termination came to the attention of the defendant in August 2003, it was not the subject of trial preparation, as the plaintiff’s intention to assert this claim was not communicated until two days prior to the scheduled trial date when the proposed amended Statement of Claim was delivered. In these circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a short adjournment to prepare for this alternative claim.
 In the second motion, which was conditional on an adjournment of the trial being ordered, the plaintiff seeks leave to further amend the Statement of Claim to increase the amount of the damages claimed, which will remove the action from the procedural scheme established under Rule 76 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 and, in turn, require that the plaintiff be subject to the right of examination for discovery. These alleged additional damages relate both to the statutory claims added in the amended Statement of Claim as well as to the alternative claim of wrongful termination in August 2003.
 This motion comes at a very late stage in the proceedings. However, even at this late date, I think it would be unjust not to grant leave to the plaintiff to further amend the Statement of Claim to increase the amount of his claim for damages as there is no apparent prejudice to the defendant that cannot be compensated for by costs. Accordingly, leave to amend the Statement of Claim within the next twenty days is hereby granted.
 The defendant submits that it should be awarded its costs that have been thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the trial. It estimates these costs at $10,000. I have approached the issue of costs by separating the cost consequences of the two motions.
 With respect to the first motion, in view of the availability of trial dates during each week in February, the length of any adjournment solely for the purpose of preparation of a defence to the plaintiff’s alternative claim and his claim for punitive damages would be very short. On this basis, any costs thrown away as a result of this adjournment should be negligible. In addition, in view of the status of this action, I think the costs should be payable at the time a decision is rendered in this action by the trial judge or when other final determination of this action occurs. I think reasonable costs, including the portion of the proceedings this morning devoted to this issue, are $1,000. Accordingly, costs in this amount are awarded in favour of the defendant, to be payable at the time an order is rendered giving effect to a decision in this action by the trial judge or other final determination of this action.
 With respect to the second motion, any costs thrown away as a result of a further extension of the adjournment beyond February 28, 2007 should be borne by the plaintiff, except to the extent such extension results from actions of the defendant that unnecessarily prolonged the adjournment. It is, however, is impossible to determine the quantum of such costs on that basis at the present time.
 Accordingly, it is ordered that the defendant shall be entitled to such additional costs, if any, as the trial judge may determine were thrown away as a result of the adjournment of the trial if the trial does not proceed before February 28, 2007, other than costs resulting from actions of the defendant that unnecessarily prolonged the adjournment.
 On consent, the action against the defendant AIG Life of Canada is dismissed without costs.
H.J.W. Siegel J.
DATE: February 20, 2007
Smith v. Co-Operators Life Insurance Company, 2007 55369 (ON SC)
1463150 Ontario Limited (Edgecon) v. 11 Christie Street Inc., 2007 44943 (ON SC)
R. v. Emsley, 2007 9888 (ON SC)
R. v. Bennett, 2007 21115 (ON SC)
Peoples Trust Company v. Paragon Health Care Inc., 2007 40218 (ON SC)
<<< | >>>
For your knowledge:
(Ruslan has suicide last summer 2015 you must be happy now master)
Guzha v. Eclipse Colour & Imaging Corp., 2005 2400 (ON SC)
Masters Chambers Chambres des Protonotaires 393 University Ave.
Superior Court of Justice Cour superieure de justice 6th Floor
Toronto Region Région de Toronto Toronto, Ontario M5G 1E6
Registrar: (416) 327-8798
Facsimile: (416) 326 5416
A motion in this action took place on October 27, 2004 by appearance.
Ruslan Guzha v. Eclipse Colour & Imaging Corp. & AIG Life of Canada
Madeleine L. S Loewenberg, counsel for the moving defendant Eclipse Colour & Imaging Corp. Fax: 416-603-6035
Nicolette Holovaci, counsel for defendant AIG Life of Canada Fax: 416-365-0021
Allan Roulen, counsel for the responding plaintiff Fax: 416–365-7702
 The plaintiff has brought this action under the simplified procedure set out in Rule 76 against two defendants. First he sues his employer Eclipse Colour & Imaging Corp. (“Eclipse”) for damages for constructive wrongful dismissal and for breach of his employment contract owing to the failure of Eclipse to pay short-term disability benefits which the plaintiff says he is entitled to. Secondly, the plaintiff sues as an insured under a group insurance policy underwritten by AIG Life Canada (“AIG”) alleging that AIG has breached that insurance policy by failing to pay him long-term disability benefits he says he is entitled to.
 Both Eclipse and AIG object to the plaintiff bringing this action under the simplified procedure on grounds that this action does not meet the requirements set out in subrule 76.02 (1). Each defendant has a different objection. I will deal first with the objection which Eclipse raises.
 The plaintiff claims damages of $50, 000 from Eclipse and damages of $50,000 from AIG. Eclipse submits that requirement two set out in subrule 76.02 (1) means that the total amount of money claimed (exclusive of interest and costs) in an action brought under Rule 76 cannot exceed $50, 000. Here, Eclipse points out, the total amount of money which the plaintiff claims is $100,000. In consequence Eclipse says, requirement two is not met and this action must continue under the regular procedure, not the Rule 76 simplified procedure.
 The plaintiff responds that he has met requirement two in subrule 76.02 (1) because the amount of money claimed from any one defendant does not exceed $50, 000 and the claim against Eclipse is separate and distinct from the claim against AIG.
 In Lillie v. Bisson reflex, (1999), 42 O.R. (3d) 524 the Court of Appeal said (at paragraph 4) that “the court should encourage a liberal interpretation of Rule 76 to carry out the policy behind the rule which is to reduce the cost of litigating claims of modest sums by reducing the amount of procedure available in such cases.”
 Rule 76 clearly permits the use of the simplified procedure in actions for amounts in excess of $50,000. Under subrule 76.02 (2) two or more plaintiffs may bring a single action for an amount in excess of $50,000 if each plaintiff’s claim, considered separately, meets the requirements of subrule 76.02 (1). Thus if no single plaintiff claims an amount in excess $50,000, the requirements of subrule 76.02 (1) are met even though the total amount of money claimed in that single action far exceeds
 By applying a liberal interpretation to requirement two in subrule 76.02 (1,) I hold that the monetary limit requirement is met if the total amount claimed against any single defendant does not exceed $50,000 even if the total amount claimed in the entire action exceeds $50, 000. Such is the case here.
 I therefore find that this action does meet monetary limit requirement two in subrule 76.02 (1) and reject the objection which Eclipse has raised to the use of Rule 76 simplified procedure in this action.
 I turn now to the different objection which AIG raises. After AIG delivered its statement of defence, its counsel became concerned that the plaintiff was seeking a declaration respecting his entitlement to have AIG pay him long-term disability benefits. The statement of claim itself does not seek any declaratory relief.
 Counsel for AIG wrote to plaintiff’s counsel to determine whether or not the plaintiff was seeking declaratory relief. If declaratory relief were sought this action would not meet requirement one in subrule 76.02 (1). Requirement one limits Rule 76 procedure to claims for money, real property and personal property. Declaratory relief is not a permitted claim.
 Unfortunately, the letter which plaintiff’s counsel wrote back to counsel for AIG served only to confuse matters respecting the declaratory relief situation. This issue was resolved only during argument of this motion.
 The plaintiff is not seeking declaratory relief from AIG. In the course of determining whether AIG breached the group insurance policy in question by not paying the plaintiff long term disability benefits, the court will have to make a finding of mixed fact and law as to whether at a material time the plaintiff was disabled to such a degree as to be entitled to have AIG pay him long term disability benefits. Such a finding is not a declaration or a declaratory judgment. It is the sort of finding which courts make in a great many actions in the course of determining liability to pay money damages. For example, in the course of determining whether Eclipse is liable to pay the plaintiff damages for constructive wrongful dismissal, the court will have to make a finding of mixed fact and law as to whether the events leading up to the plaintiff’s departure from Eclipse amount to constructive wrongful dismissal. Such a finding is not a declaratory judgment.
 In conclusion, I reject both objections to the plaintiff’s use of Rule 76 simplified procedure in this action.
 At the conclusion of oral argument I gave directions respecting costs submissions. I await those submissions.
November 5, 2004
 I have now had an opportunity of considering the costs submissions of the parties.
 As between the plaintiff and the moving defendant Eclipse, the plaintiff was successful and should receive the costs of the motion as regards the objection which Eclipse raised. I fix the fair and reasonable amount of costs which Eclipse should pay the plaintiff at $1,500. Eclipse is to pay the plaintiff such costs within 30 days.
 As between the plaintiff and AIG, the situation is somewhat different. Counsel for the plaintiff could have met AIG’s objection prior to the motion by confirming clearly that the plaintiff was not seeking declaratory relief. Instead he wrote a letter which was confusing and raised concerns at AIG that the plaintiff was indeed seeking declaratory relief. While it is true that plaintiff’s counsel did answer AIG’s objection at the hearing of the motion, he did so only by making it clear at that stage that the plaintiff was not seeking declaratory relief. In the meantime, AIG was put to expense in raising an objection to what appeared to be a claim by the plaintiff for declaratory relief.
 In these circumstances, AIG should receive the costs of that part of the motion which concerned AIG. I fix the fair and reasonable amount of those costs at $1,000 and order the plaintiff to pay AIG such costs within 30 days.
January 25, 2005
Case Management Master Thomas Hawkins
Predie v. Paul Sadlon Motors Inc., 2005 4447 (ON SC)
Toronto Standard Condominium Corps. No. 1517 and 1438 v. Concord Adex Development Corp., 2005 24257 (ON SC)
Commonwealth Insurance Co. v. Intercon Security Ltd., 2005 28534 (ON SC)
Pylypuk v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Business Services), 2005 5860 (ON SC)
Fareed v. Wood, 2005 34579 (ON SC)
<<< | >>>
Note:for the full transcript ,you could find them on a web page from google search.